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CASENOTES

STANFORD v. KENTUCKY*: THE MINIMUM AGE
FOR THE MAXIMUM PENALTY - DEATH
On June 26, 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided the
fate of juveniles' on death row.' In Stanford v. Kentucky,' the Court
addressed the issue of whether the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the eighth amendment" prohibits the death penalty 5 for
* 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
1. "Capital punishment of children refers to sentencing to death or executing a
person for a crime committed by that person at an age of less than eighteen years."
Streib, Death Penalty For Children: The American Experience With Capital Punishment For Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613
(1983) [hereinafter Children]. This phenomenon has re-emerged as a controversial
issue of national importance in the 1980's. Id. Two trends have caused the reappearance of the death penalty for children. Id. at 614. Streib, an expert in the area,
explains:
One trend is an increasing willingness to subject persons under the maximum juvenile court jurisdiction age limit to criminal prosecution, either
through direct prosecution of the child in criminal court or through initial juvenile criminal court. The other trend is the return to reliance upon capital
punishment in the criminal justice system.
Id. See generally J. GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 105-07 (1983) (discussing growth
of crime spreading anger, which led to increased acceptance of capital punishment).
2. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980. Presently, 1.46% of the death row population
are juveniles. Brief for Petitioner at 23, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989)
(No. 87-5765). Of the 2,110 individuals currently sentenced to death, thirty-one (two
females and twenty-nine males) are juveniles. Id. The most recent executions involved two Texans, Jay Kelly Pinkerton in 1986 and Charles Rumbauch in 1985, and
James Terry Roach from South Carolina in 1986. Streib, The Eighth Amendment
and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 363, 364 n.1 (1986) [hereinafter Juveniles]. Prior to these executions, there was a 21 year moratorium of juvenile executions. Id. Imposing the maximum penalty of death on young offenders has
been sporadic but persistent, as evidenced by the peak period for such punishment in
the 1940's. Id. at 380. Furthermore, 16-year-old Thomas Graunger was executed in
1642 for bestiality. Id. at 364 n.1.
3. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
4. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution states that: "Ex-

cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment be inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Court's review of the constitutionality of the death penalty is actually a recent development. See H. BEDAU, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 247 (1982). In the past, the constitutionality of the penalty was never questioned. Id. Indeed, at the time of the constitution's drafting, it
was taken for granted that life could be forfeited for punishment, as hanging was a
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individuals who commit capital crimes at sixteen or seventeen years
of age.6 Through an incomplete analysis, the Court determined the
minimum age for which an offender could receive the death penalty'
and thus resolved this emotionally charged issue.' The Court limited
the amendment's extension to those practices contrary to the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"' concluding that the cruel and unusual punishment clause
did not automatically exempt sixteen and seventeen-year-old capital
murderers. 0
Stanford v. Kentucky" involved two consolidated cases. The
circumstances of the first case originated on the night of January 7,
1981, when twenty-year-old Baerbel Poore was repeatedly raped and
common criminal penalty. Id.
5. The death penalty is defined as a supreme penalty exacted as punishment for

murder and other capital crimes.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

360 (5th ed. 1979). For an

overview of the death penalty including background, attitudes toward the penalty,
and justification for it, see H. BEDAU, supra note 4. See also J. GORECKI, supra note 1,
at 83-97 (detailing capital punishment in America from the 19th century to the present); Van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 957
(1985) (people disagree on three issues of death penalty - constitutionality, deterrence, and moral justification).
6. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974. Most juveniles were age 16 or 17 when they
committed their offenses, although history denotes cases of individuals age 10 being

executed. See V.

STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILEs

71 (1987) [hereinafter V.

STREE].

7. The Court previously resolved whether the execution of an individual, who
was under 16 years of age at the time of the offense, violated the eighth amendment
in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988). Thompson participated in the
brutal slaying of his sister's former husband, along with three older individuals. Id. at
2690. After being certified to stand trial as an adult, he was convicted and sentenced
to death. Id. The Supreme Court, in striking down the sentence as unconstitutional,
relied on the majority of states establishing a minimum age for the death penalty at
no less than 16. Id. at 2693. The Court also looked to jury behavior, views of professional organizations, and beliefs of other countries. Id. at 2696-97. Since the Court
refused to draw the line at 18 for infliction of the death penalty, it left unanswered
whether a 16-or 17-year-old murderer could receive a death sentence. E.g., Too Young
to Die, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 30, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
The Thompson case was not the first occasion where the Court left the constitutionality of juvenile executions unanswered. Compare Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 105 (1982) (reversing death sentence of 16-year-old who murdered a highway
patrolman because trial court refused mitigating evidence) with Trimble v. Maryland,
300 Md. 387, 393, 478 A.2d 1143, 1146 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 1231 (1985) (17year-old sentenced to death for rape-murder). See also Note, Juvenile Criminals and
the Death penalty: Resurrection of the Question Left Unanswered in Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 11 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. AND CIV. CONFINEMENT 437 (1985) (discussing the
Trimble case); United States Supreme Court 1982 Decisions Affecting Juveniles, 7 J.
Juv. L. 176 (1983) (examining Eddings in a brief account).
8. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
9. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (eighth amendment forbids Congress to punish by depriving a citizen of his nationality)).
10. Id.
11. 109 S. Ct. at 2972. See also Reuben, Court Takes Up 3 Capital Cases, 2
with Minors, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 27, 1989, at 1, col. 6 (addressing the case at bar
including facts and arguments).
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sodomized during the commission of a gas station robbery by Kevin
Stanford, who at the time was seventeen years and four months of
age. 2 Stanford and his accomplice" then drove Poore to a secluded
area, 4 where Stanford shot her point-blank in the face and then in
the back of the head.'
Following Stanford's certification for trial as an adult, 6 he was
convicted and sentenced to death for murder, first degree sodomy,
first degree robbery, and receiving stolen property.17 The Kentucky
Supreme Court upheld the death sentence by rejecting petitioner's
argument that he had a constitutional right to rehabilitation. 8
The circumstances of the second case originated on the evening
of July 27, 1985, when Heath Wilkins, who at the time was sixteen
years and six months of age, stabbed to death twenty-six-year-old
Nancy Allen, mother of two.' 9 Wilkins planned to rob Allen's conve12. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2972. Upon leaving the gas station, Stanford ("petitioner") stole 300 cartons of cigarettes, two gallons of fuel and a small amount of
cash. Id. at 2973.
13. Brief for Respondent at 4, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989)
(No. 87-5765). David Buchanan also repeatedly raped and sodomized Poore, while
Troy Johnson awaited the defendants' return in his car. Id.
14. Id. Johnson and Buchanan followed Stanford, who drove Poore in her
mother's car to the secluded area. Id. "The victim's corpse was left kneeling in the
back seat of her mother's car, naked from the waist down and with her buttocks
elevated." Id. at 5.
15. Id. Petitioner explained Poore's execution as follows: "I had to shoot her,
the bitch lived next door to me and she would recognize me. * * * I guess we could
have tied her up or something or beat the ... out of her and told her, if she tell, we
would kill her." Id. at 6. During his conversation over the incident with a corrections
officer, Stanford laughed. Id.
16. The Kentucky transfer statute certifying Stanford for trial as an adult provides in relevant part:
(3) If the court determines that probable cause exists, it shall then determine if
it is in the best interest of the child and the community to order such a transfer based upon the seriousness of the alleged offense; whether the offense was
against person or property, with greater weight being given to offenses against
persons; the maturity of the child as determined by his environment; the
child's prior record; and the prospects for adequate protection of the public
and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile justice system.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (repealed effective July
15, 1984).
Following Stanford's transfer, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted legislation abolishing juvenile executions. Brief for Petitioner at 44, Stanford v. Kentucky,
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989) (No. 87-5765). This legislation was to take effect on July 15,
1984 but was repealed. Id. Finally, new legislation setting the minimum age at 16
replaced KRS 208.170 in 1987. Id. The juvenile court found transfer to be in the best
interest of both petitioner and the community. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
17. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
18. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987). The court
found there was no appropriate treatment for Stanford in the juvenile system. Id.
Since age 10, he has been exposed to treatment for sexual abuse, arson, theft, assault,
and burglary, to name but a few. Id.
19. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973. While Allen lay helpless on the floor after Wilkins' ("petitioner") initial stabbing, she spoke up to assist his accomplice in opening
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nience store and murder
whoever was behind the counter, so as not
20
to leave witnesses.
After the juvenile court certified petitioner for trial as an
adult,21 he pleaded guilty to first degree murder, armed criminal ac-

tion and carrying a concealed weapon. 2 ' The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the death sentence, rejecting the argument that such
punishment violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause.2
the cash register, which prompted petitioner to stab her three more times in the
chest. Id. Patrick Stevens assisted Wilkins in the actual robbery, while two other
abettors, Ray Thompson and Marjorie Filipiak, secured transportation for a quick
departure. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo. 1987). As Allen pleaded for her
life, Wilkins stabbed her four more times in the neck to silence her. Stanford, 109 S.
Ct. at 2973. She was left to die on the floor, as petitioner and his accomplice gathered
their proceeds from the robbery, including liquor, cigarettes, $450 in cash and checks,
and rolling papers. Id.
20. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973. Prior to the crime, various steps were taken by
Wilkins that indicated a great deal of planning. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 417.
He sharpened his butterfly knife, wiped his muddy shoes so as to not leave mud
prints in the deli, left the bag for the proceeds outside the store, and wiped his fingerprints off the door handle. Id. at 411-12.
21. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 411-12. Wilkins could not automatically be tried as
an adult, because he was six months short of the age of majority. Id. See Mo. REV.
STAT. § 211.021 (1986) (adult defined as person 17 years of age or older). The Missouri statute under which Wilkins was transferred provides that in determining
whether to certify, the juvenile court must consider:
(1) The seriousness of the offense alleged and whether the protection of the
community requires transfer to the court of general jurisdiction;
(2) Whether the offense alleged involved viciousness, force and violence;
(3) Whether the offense alleged was against persons or property with greater
weight being given to the offense against persons, especially if personal injury
resulted;
(4) Whether the offense alleged is a part of a repetitive pattern of offenses
which indicates that the child may be beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile
code;
(5) The record and history of the child, including experience with a juvenile
justice system, other courts, supervision, commitments to juvenile institutions
and other placements;
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of his home and environmental situation, emotional condition and pattern
of living;
(7) The program and facilities available to the juvenile court in considering
disposition; and
(8) Whether or not the child can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitative
programs available to the juvenile court. Id.
22. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973. Both the state and Wilkins urged the death
penalty. Id. at 2974. Other evidence at the punishment hearing indicated that he had
frequented juvenile facilities since the age of eight for burglary, theft, arson, and attempting to kill his mother with tainted tylenol capsules. Id.
23. Id. The court found the slaying exceptional in its brutality. Wilkins, 736
S.W. 2d at 417. Not only did the petitioner have a pre-existing plan to kill, but he
allowed the victim to suffer through further mutilation. Id. The court also was disturbed by Wilkins' barbarous attitude toward human life. Id. "In his words, Nancy
Allen was a trash can whose most convenient disposition was to be killed so she
would not be a bother to defendant in the future." Id. See also United States v.
Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1137 (7th Cir. 1978) (trial court has broad discretion in sentencing defendant).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari" ' in both
cases to consider whether the eighth amendment protects individuals who commit crimes at sixteen or seventeen years of age from the
death penalty.25 The Court held that imposing the death penalty for
crimes committed at age sixteen and older does not violate of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause, as long as no national consensus develops against it."
In determining whether there had been a violation of the eighth
amendment, the Court looked not only to historical evidence" but
to modern American" standards.29 Although the Stanford Court interpreted the amendment in a dynamic and flexible manner," it lim24. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 217 (1988); Wilkins v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct.
2896 (1988).
25. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
26. Id. at 2980.
27. Id. at 2974. The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that neither Stanford nor Wilkins' death sentence constitutes an act of punishment considered barbarous and thus condemned by the common law in 1789. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974;
see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (eighth amendment prohibits
the infliction of the death penalty on the insane); Note, Ford v. Wainwright, Statutory Changes and a New Test for Sanity: You Can't Execute Me, I'm Crazy!, 35
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 515 (1987) (discussing procedures and tests to determine validity of
insanity claim). Since the earliest recorded lawful execution in this country in 1622
(Daniel Frank, Virginia, for theft), 18,000 to 20,000 individuals have lawfully been
put to death. H. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 3. "Probably an equal number has been
sentenced to death but spared for one reason or another sentencing, retrial, hospitalization as insane, executive clemency, natural death." Id.
Furthermore, the common law permitted capital punishment on anyone above
the age of seven, as the rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit a felony was
14 years old. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *23 (1847) (illustrating sentences of death on children);
Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 LAw Q. REv. 364 (1937)
(detailing the historical punishment of children from the fourteenth century through
the twentieth); Juveniles, supra note 2, at 614-616 (discussing the historical background of the death penalty for children while tracing its roots). According to professor Streib, 281 offenders under the age of 18 have been put to death in the states. V.
STREIB, supra note 6, at 57. These executions account for 2% of the total number of
executions. Id. at 55.'
28. The Stanford Court rejected petitioners' argument that practices of foreign
countries are dispositive. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 n.1. The Court explained:
[Wihile 'the practices of other nations, particularly other democracies, can be
relevant to determining whether a practice uniform among our people is not
merely an historical accident, but rather so implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in
our Constitution as well' see Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716-17 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) "they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people").
Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 n.1. "We must never forget that it is a Constitution for
the United States of America that we are expounding." Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108
S. Ct. 2687, 2716 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
30. The Court has not confined the cruel and unusual punishment clause to
prohibiting only those methods outlawed in the 18th century. Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 171 (1976). The Gregg Court held in a landmark decision, that the punish-
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ited the cruel and unusual punishment clause's prohibition to practices contrary to the evolving standards of decency." The Court,
deferring to state legislatures32 and the amendment's language,33 relied on objective factors" as opposed to the subjective conceptions
of each individual Justice.3 5
The most reliable objective s6 signs, indicating society's attitude
toward a given punishment, consist of legislative enactments.3" The
plurality's analysis focused generally on the thirty-seven states 8
which authorize the death penalty, but specifically on the eighteen
states 8 which expressly establish a minimum age.'" Since a majorment of death for murder does not invariably violate the Constitution. Id. at 169. The
Court upheld Georgia's sentencing procedures, which did not create a substantial risk
of arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Id. at 189; contra Furman
v. Georgia, 409 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (watershed decision declaring imposition of
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment thereby placing most capital
punishment states in limbo).
31. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), the
Court declared the evolving standards of decency test.
32. The Court owes deference to the state legislators due to the structure of the
federal system and punishment as a peculiar legislative question. Gregg, 428 U.S. at
176.
33. The eighth amendment proscribes only those punishments which are both
cruel and unusual. Stanford, 109 S.Ct. at 2975.
34. The individual Justices should not rely on their own personal consciences,
but rather on objective factors to the maximum possible extent. Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2952-55 (1989) (executing mentally retarded people is not prohibited by the cruel and unusual punishment clause); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982) (reversing death sentence in the absence of proof that defendant killed or attempted to kill in robberymurder); Furman, 408 U.S. at 277-79 (Brennan, J., concurring) (reversing sentence of
death for rape).
35. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975.
36. Justice Scalia explained that "it will rarely if ever be the case that the members of this Court will have a better sense of the evolution in views of the American
people than do their elected representatives." Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2715 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
37. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975. Legislative response weighs heavily in discerning contemporary standards. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (upholding death penalty for robbery-murder, although study indicated that death penalty imposed more often on blacks); See also Moss, The Statistics of Death, 73 A.B.A.
J. 51 (Jan. 1987) (detailing the study in question); Note, McCleskey v. Kemp: Rape,
Statistics and the Death Penalty, 15 W. ST. L. REV. 179, 215 (1987) (concluding the
case provides no guidance for evaluating future statistical arguments). Judicial review
often conflicts with legislative judgment in interpreting the constitution, but courts
are not representative bodies. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1976).
38. The Supreme Court is incorrect as to the number of death penalty states
due to Vermont's rejection. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2983 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The 15 states which do not authorize the death penalty include: Alaska, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2694 n.25.
39. The 15 states which expressly establish a minimum age for the death penalty include: California (age 18); Colorado (18); Connecticut (18); Illinois (18); Maryland (18); Nebraska (18); New Jersey (18); New Hampshire (18); New Mexico (18);
Ohio (18); Oregon (18); Tennessee (18); Georgia (17); North Carolina (17); and, Texas
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ity"I of the states that allow capital punishment permit it for crimes
committed at age sixteen or above, the Court concluded there was
not a national consensus previously found sufficient to be characterized as cruel and unusual. 2 The Stanford Court distinguished four
3
past cases - Coker v. Georgia,"
Enmund v. Florida,4 4 Ford v. Wain45
4
8
wright, and Solem v. Helm - in which it invalidated the death
47
penalty because a national consensus precluded such punishment.
4
8
The Court then announced that Tison v. Arizona, which upheld
the death penalty for participation in a felony resulting in murder,
was more analogous as only eleven jurisdictions rejected the penalty
49
in such instances.
With respect to federal statutes, 50 the plurality relied on laws
permitting sixteen and seventeen-year-olds to be tried as adults for
offenses bearing a capital penalty.51 The Court emphasized that
even if all federal statutes exempted individuals under eighteen
from execution, 5 this would not establish a national consensus opposing such punishment, due to the many states which allow it." As
(17). Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 n.2. In addition, three more states, Indiana, Kentucky, and Nevada set the minimum age at 16. Id. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2975. Justice Scalia, who announced the decision upholding juvenile
executions, also wrote the dissent in Thompson, where the death penalty for a 16year-old murderer was reversed. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. The Court included in the majority the 18 states with no minimum age,
believing they would allow it for 16-year-olds. The 18 states include: Alabama; Arizona; Arkansas; Delaware; Florida; Idaho; Louisiana; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana;
Oklahoma; Pennsylvania; South Carolina; South Dakota; Utah; Virginia; Washington;
and Wyoming. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2695 n.26. Therefore, to achieve a majority
the Court included the three states which set the minimum age at 16, and the 18
states with no minimum age.
42. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975-76.
43. 433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977) (invalidated death penalty for rape because
Georgia sole jurisdiction which allowed this punishment).
44. 458 U.S. 782, 792 (1982) (only eight jurisdictions allowed death penalty for
participation in robbery, where accomplice takes life).
45. 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (no state allowed execution of insane).
46. 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983) (striking down life sentence without parole under a
recidivist statute because no other state would have treated defendant so harshly).
47. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2976.
48. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). The Tison brothers assisted their father's escape from
prison and later watched their father murder a family of four. Id. at 154. The Court
reasoned that the brothers' major participation in a felony with reckless indifference
to human life justified capital punishment. Id.
49. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2976.
50. The Court failed to find petitioners' argument that a new drug law, limiting
the death penalty to those over 18, was relevant. Id.
51. Id. See also State v. Azevedo, 386 F. Supp. 622 (D.C. Haw. 1974) (rejecting
16-year-old, charged with murder and possibility of death penalty, was denied right
of juvenile treatment).
52. The Court drew an analogy between the absence of a federal statute exempting persons under 18 from capital punishment and the absence of a federal lottery. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977. The Court concluded that neither established a
national consensus against a lottery, or juvenile executions respectively. Id.
53. Id.
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it is not Kentucky nor Missouri's burden to establish a national consensus for such treatment of juveniles, petitioners failed to carry the
burden of establishing a national consensus against it through legislative enactments. 4
Next, the opinion addressed the behavior of juries in determining current standards.5 5 Although a smaller number of criminals
under eighteen have received death sentences,56 the Court considered this misleading because a smaller number of juveniles commit
capital crimes.5 7 The Court concluded that the reluctance of juries
to impose, and prosecutors to seek, death sentences was not demonstrated by these statistics.5"
Completing an analysis of the two primary indicators of evolving standards, the Stanford Court rejected all other factors put
forth by petitioners. 9 The Court excluded from its list of relevant
sources age-based statutory classifications which set eighteen as the
legal age for various activities such as voting and purchasing alcohol.60 The Supreme Court reasoned that such laws set ages appropriate for a system which makes determinations in gross and not individually. 1 These age statutes are in stark contrast with the
individualized considerations inherent in the criminal justice system.2 To determine societal views as to whether eighteen is the age
before which no one can be held responsible, the Court looked to
state statutes detailing the minimum age rendering a juvenile eligi54. Id. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (heavy burden on
those who attack the people's voice-legislators); Brief for Respondent at 20, Stanford
v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1988) (No. 87-5765) (suggesting the burden is by clear
and convincing evidence).
55. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
56. The Court acknowledged that of the 2,106 death sentences handed down
between 1982 and 1988, only 15 were imposed on individuals less than 16 years old at
the time of the offense, and only 30 on individuals less than 17. Id.
57. Id. But see V. STREIB, supra note 6, at 29 (juveniles committing nine percent of capital murders, but receiving only two to three percent of death sentences).
58. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
59. Id.
60. Id. Various organizations filing briefs amicus curiae support age statutes as
a relevant source for eighth amendment analysis. See, e.g., Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at
2985 n.n.4-5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Collateral Representative for the State of Florida, American Bar Association, and National Legal Aid and Defender Association to
name but a few); See also Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2701-06 (1988) (detailing age
statute including right to vote, serve on jury, drive, etc.).
61. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977. These age statutes do not represent that all
minors are not responsible. Id.
62. Id. at 2978-79. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (dictates that
individualized consideration is a constitutional requirement). The Court continued by
stating that one individualized mitigating factor is age. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2978.
See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (evidence of age relevant
as mitigating factor). For a list of the 29 states which have codified age as a mitigating factor, see Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2978 n.5. The Supreme Court declared that the
juvenile transfer process to adult court ensures individual analysis. Id. at 2978.
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ble for death rather than for voting and drinking."
The Court declined to adopt public opinion polls, views of interest groups, and positions of professional associations as further indicators of contemporary standards of decency." The Supreme
Court also rejected the theory that the death penalty for sixteen and
seventeen-year old criminals should be invalidated because it fails to
serve legitimate penal goals. 5 Since the Court's function is to determine what the correct standards are and not what they should be, a
subjective approach was emphatically repudiated in the opinion.6
Finally, the Stanford Court suggested that a proportionality analysis, examining whether the punishment imposed and the defendant's
blameworthiness is proportional, was unnecessary since no punishment had ever been invalidated' solely on that basis and such analysis was repetitive, as it could only be conducted through the use of
contemporary standards. 7
The Stanford decision correctly held that imposing capital punishment on a sixteen or seventeen-year old capital murderer was rnot
prohibited by the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause. This decision was correct for three reasons. First,
eighth amendment analysis is informed by examining contemporary
attitudes toward a punishment through the reliable indicia of legislative and jury response. Second, a rejection of other indicators of
current standards including age-statutes, views of interest groups
and foreign countries, goals of penology, and subjective preferences
63. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
64. Id. The Court, in disclaiming the opinions of respected organizations, announced that a revised national consensus of such constitutional magnitude must appear in the laws and applications of laws approved by the people. Id.
65. Id. See generally Scheidegger, Capital Punishment in 1987: The Puzzle
Nears Completion, 15 W. ST. U. L. REV. 95, 95-104 (1987) (detailing not only the three
traditional reasons for punishment - retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation - but
also education, prevention, and restraint). The Stanford Court rejected that the
death penalty fails to deter because juveniles have less cognitive skills than adults
and also that it fails to yield just retribution because juveniles possess less blameworthiness due to immaturity. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979. To argue that a punishment
is cruel and unusual, an opponent must be armed with eighth amendment analysis
and not socioscientific evidence relating the emotional development of persons 16 or
17-years old. Id.
66. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979. The Court's interpretation of the eighth
amendment must not be guided by personal preferences but by society's apparent
skepticism. Id. But see Brief for Petitioner at 23, Wilkins v. Missouri, 108 S. Ct.
2896 (1988) (No. 87-6026) (arguing the Court should add its own informed judgment).
The Court in rejecting a subjective approach states that such an approach would replace judges with philosopher-kings. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
67. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980. The Court, in excluding the proportionality
analysis, relied on prior cases where a punishment was condemned not only under
this analysis but also under the two primary indicators - state laws and jury determinations. Id. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 299-300 (1983) (court considered
other state laws); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982) (court looked to
both state law and jury determinations).
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was proper for lack of relevancy. Finally, the evidence supported the
holding as sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders can reasonably
be held fully responsible for their acts.
However, the Court's opinion contains two flaws. First, the plurality failed to identify the quantitative degree which would establish a categorical unacceptability of the death penalty for offenders
under eighteen by juries. Second, the Court should have inquired
further by focusing on a proportionality analysis as dictated by precedent. By evading specificity and ignoring precedent, the Supreme
Court weakened its opinion creating uncertainty for future criminal
defendants.
The framers of the Constitution delegated the task of defining
the contours of an unconditional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to future generations." In defining an age below
which a juvenile can never be held fully responsible for murder, the
Supreme Court has been guided by evolving standards of decency."
The Supreme Court has divided over the correct evaluation of indicia evidencing a national consensus.'0 Where the law to be designed
corresponds to social realities, deference to legislative judgment is a
necessity. 1 In a democracy, legislatures respond to the will of the
people and consequently, the Court will rarely have a better sense
of the evolution of American views than do the people's elected representatives. 7' Further, the rationale for using the laws and applications of laws (legislative and jury determinations) lies in the language of the construed clause, because "unusual" depends upon the
4
frequency of a penalty's occurrence.
68. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691.
69. Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring). All of the Justices agree that some
age exists, below which a juvenile murderer can never be constitutionally punished by
death. Id. Furthermore, they agree that locating such an age requires guidance from
an evolving clause, which acquires meaning through enlightened public opinion. Id.
The Justices fail to agree on what factors determine a social consensus. Id.
70. Id.
71. The death penalty for juveniles should be based on the current realities and
community sentiment. Comment, Capital Punishment for Juveniles - A Constitutional Minimum Set by Elastic Principles, 16 CAP. U.L. REV. 657, 672 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Elastic]. The backbone of our legal system is societal standards.
Comment, Youth on Death Row: Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdictionand Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juvenile Offenders, 13 N. Ky. L. REV. 495, 517 (1987)
[hereinafter Comment, Youth on Death Row]. The most important requirement of
the law is that it corresponds to community demands. H. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 316.
72. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976). Since legislative judgment
assists greatly in ascertaining current standards, the Supreme Court presumes the
validity of a punishment selected by the representatives of the people. Id. Indeed, the
legislature need not select the least severe penalty, only one which is not cruelly inhumane. Id.
73. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 2692 n.7. "The focus on the acceptability and regularity of the
death penalty's imposition in certain kinds of cases ... is connected to the insistence
that statutes permitting its imposition channel the sentencing process toward nonar-
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The legislative response to Furman v. Georgia,75 which invalidated nearly all capital punishment statutes then in existence, indicates society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder.7" Combining the fact that in the post-Furman era thirty-five states passed
new death penalty statutes, most of which fail to expressly prohibit
juvenile execution, 77 and the current juveniles on death row, 78 a national consensus opposing the execution of murderous juveniles is
not apparent.
The Stanford Court was also correct in rejecting irrelevant indicators of contemporary standards. 7 Ages set forth in the generalized system of voting, drinking and driving are not comparable to
the ages at which the states allow their individualized criminal systems to operate." Indeed, an individual can be mature enough to
comprehend that murder is wrong without being old enough to
drink responsibly."' Positions adopted both by interest groups and
bitrary results." Id. In other words, the lack of jury interest in imposing a death
sentence indicates societal resistance to such punishment. Id. In addition, juries
maintain a link between contemporary values and the penal system. Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 190.
75. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
76. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179. See also GORECKI, supra note 1, at 105-07 (discussing how the growth of crime leads to anger, which leads to an increased acceptance of
death penalty); W. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE 2 (1984) (detailing the effects of
Furman); Streib, Executions Under the Post-Furman CapitalPunishment Statutes:
The Halting Progress from "Let's Do it" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point in Pulling
So Tight", 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 443, 447 (1984) (comparison between the first 11 executions following Furman).
77. Children, supra note 1, at 640; see also Hill, Can the Death Penalty be
Imposed on Juveniles: The Unanswered Question in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM.
L. BULL. 5, 12-17 (1984) (addressing legislative attitudes toward juvenile executions).
78. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Petitioner at
25a, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1988) (No. 87-5765) (detailing the
juveniles sentenced to death since 1982).
79. Contra V. STREIB, supra note 6, at 30-34 (favorably discussing other indicia
of current standards, besides legislative and jury decisions).
80. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989). But see Batey, The
Rights of Adolescents, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363 (1982) (noting the ages at which
individuals are considered children versus adults for purposes of driving, voting,
working .. .). In contrast to the generalized system of driving, drinking, and voting,
the criminal justice system can conduct individualized maturity tests and thus the
two systems are not comparable. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977. As evidence of this
individualized treatment, see Brief for Petitioner at 28a, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.
Ct. 2969 (1988) (No. 87-5765) for a list of ten states which codify age as a mitigating
circumstance.
81. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977. Statutes more applicable than age based
statutory classifications, such as drinking and driving, are the juvenile waiver statutes. See National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, United States
Dept. of Justice, Major Issues in Juvenile Justice Information and Training, Youth
in Adult Courts: Between Two Worlds 203 (1982) [hereinafter Between Two Worlds].
Almost every jurisdiction has at least one route in which juveniles are transferred into
criminal courts. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2694 n.24 (1988). See also
Brief for Respondent at 28, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1988) (No. 875765) (all 36 death penalty states have passed or amended juvenile waiver statutes
after the seminal Furman case).
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by foreign countries are also inappropriate as having no constitutional foundation. 2 To establish a consensus among American people, where none exists, by superimposing the standards of other
countries, who are situated differently, is unquestionably dubious.8 3
Furthermore, the Court properly rejected that juvenile executions failed to serve the age old justification of retribution and deterrence, because it has not been proven that a sixteen-year-old is
not adequately responsible. 4 Moreover, the constantly changing social conditions hinder any statistical attempt to evaluate the deter8 5
rent value of the death penalty, leading to inconclusive results.
The Court also properly suppressed personal preferences in support
of objective legislative wisdom. When the Court chooses between
competing political and economic interests, the judiciary's independence is endangered by the petty passions of the day. 7
Finally, the Supreme Court justifiably affirmed the death
sentences, because a sixteen or seventeen-year-old can form cold,
calculative criminal intent as easily as can an adult. These young,
street-wise offenders, deemed inappropriate candidates for treatment in the juvenile system, are transferred to adult courts.8 As
82. The Thompson dissent emphasized the inappropriateness of establishing
the fundamental beliefs of this country through the standards of foreign countries.
Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even if the rest of the world
was opposed to juvenile executions, that would not be determinative in the instant
case. Id. But cf. Hill, supra note 77, at 18 (discussing international opinion on the
death penalty for juveniles).
83. Just as non-capital states are irrelevant to minimum age for the death penalty, so are foreign countries. Brief for Respondent at 21, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109
S. Ct. 2969 (1988) (No. 87-5765). Furthermore, international comparisons are unreliable due to the different cultures and crimes. Id. at 22. American homicide rate is as
much as ten times higher than numerous other countries. Id.
84. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979; see also H. BEDAU, supra note 4, at 311 (Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate: protecting society is adequate justification for capital punishment). Contra Gale, Retribution,Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 973 (1985) (justification of punishment is insufficient for capital punishment);
Children, supra note 1, at 637 (justification of retribution less appealing for minors);
but cf. Comment, TheCost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1221 (1985) (arguing more costly to execute than to
rehabilitate).
85. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976). A scientific conclusion as to
the worth of the death penalty as a deterrent is impossible. Id. at 185. The problem is
that social conditions in any state fluctuate, and social conditions in any two states
are not similar. Id.
86. Id. at 176 n.20. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in Thompson,
108 S. Ct. at 2709, stated: "I would not substitute our inevitably subjective judgment
about the best age at which to draw a line . . . for the judgments of the nation's
legislatures."
87. See Reidinger, A Court Divided, 73 A.B.A. J. 46, 50 (Jan. 1987).
88. More serious juvenile offenders are transferred out of the juvenile justice
system and into adult courts, subjecting them to the harshest sanctions. V. STREIB,
supra note 6, at 22. See also Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 734 n.4 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (some older minors become hardened criminals and deserve no special
treatment).
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society becomes less tolerant of young offenders committing heinous
crimes and not responding to rehabilitation, adult punishment
seems a plausible solution to protecting both community interests
and juvenile needs.8 9 Removing hard-core criminals along with their
negative influences from the less culpable youth, prosecutors preserve the juvenile system for those more susceptible to rehabilitation. 0 Following the transfer process, juvenile offenders are justifiably held to the same standards as adults due to their adult-like
acts. "
Young culprits capable of brutal and vicious crimes, which are
overwhelmingly murder, should be held personally culpable.92 Since
moral culpability implies an understanding of right and wrong, the
real issue in determining guilt or innocence is whether youth prevented that understanding.93 Many scholars agree that an adolescent, an individual advancing from a dependent irresponsible age to
89. See Comment, Youth on Death-Row, supra note 71, at 502-03. Generally,
the juvenile system has been unsuccessful with older minors, who have had prior encounters with the law. Id. at 497. Factors influencing transfer to criminal court include age, maturity, seriousness of offense, prior delinquency, results of previous
treatment, and available treatment resources within the state. See Note, Thompson
v. Oklahoma: An Analysis of the Death Penalty as Applied to Juvenile Offenders, 34
S.D.L. REV. 762, 770 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Juvenile Offenders]; see also Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566 (1966) (Supreme Court declaring principle which
should be followed with respect to transfer); Between Two Worlds, supra note 81, at
210-11 (case study detailing seven reasons for prosecuting youths as adults).
90. See Comment, Youth on Death Row, supra note 71, at 502. A study examining the psychological and intellectual differences between juveniles who had been
petitioned .for certification to adult court and those, with similar prior delinquency,
who had not, indicated that the certified group had higher IQs. Solway, Hays,
Schreiner, & Cansler, Clinical Study of Youths Petitioned for Certification as
Adults, 46 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 1067, 1072 (1980). Also, more murder charges were
filed against the certified group. Id. at 1070.
91. See Brief for Respondent at 18, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969
(1988) (No. 87-5765); see also Between Two Worlds, supra note 81, at 211 (adult
courts better qualified to hand out punishment). Contra V. STREIB, supra note 6, at
23-4 (adult-like acts fail as justification).
92. See Reidinger, Fate of the Teenage Killers, 73 A.B.A. J. 89, 92 (Oct. 1987).
Many young offenders are in custody for murder, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Elastic, supra note 71, at 666 n.99. The common law treated young
murderers no different than their adult counterparts. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *23 (1854) (rebuttable presumption of incapacity to
form criminal intent ended at age fourteen); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(Supreme Court accepted presumption).

93. See Reidinger, The Death Row Kids, 75 A.B.A. J. 78, 82 (Apr. 1989). Recently a 10-year-old boy in shooting and killing a 7-year-old playmate took deliberate
actions in concealing tragedy and thus is being tried as an adult. Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 27, 1989, at 3, col. 1; see also Kean, supra note 27, at 367 (concealment indicates
discernment between right and wrong). For evidence of Wilkins, in the instant case,
carefully planning the murder, see supra note 20. Justice O'Connor in Thompson v.

Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2708 (1988) (O'connor, J., concurring), announced: "it
does not necessarily follow that all 15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability
that would justify capital punishment." Cf. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75
(1976) (legislative assumption that all minors incapable of providing informed consent to abortion is unconstitutional).
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a self-reliant responsible age of adulthood, begins to think beyond
the present engaging in deductive reasoning as early as age twelve."'
Chronological age should not excuse the murder and thus bar
95
the juvenile's execution; rather, it should mitigate circumstances.
If the offender was beyond the age limit, the act would be subject to
criminal penalties, but due strictly to age such conduct is treated
differently.9 6 Even conceding the differential treatment of a juvenile
because of age, the victim still suffered the same horrible abuse as if
inflicted by an adult.
Despite the accuracy of the Stanford decision, the Court relied
on a statistical fallacy relating to jury behavior. The Court, in assuming that the scarcity of juvenile death sentences stems from the
rarity of criminal homicides by juveniles, disregards other plausible
reasons. 7 Other factors include the many young offenders arrested
for murder but retained in juvenile court, and those transferred to
criminal court but not charged with capital murder.98
Since statistics, due to their manipulative nature, can
be suggestive without being conclusive, jury verdicts should be analyzed cautiously. The plurality relied on statistics which failed to indicate
how many juries had the opportunity to impose the death penalty
94. See G. MANASTER, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIFE TASKS 4-5
(1977). Piaget, a pioneer in the field of cognitive development, found at age 11 individuals can conceive of the range of possibilities including hypothetical situations. S.
HENGGELER, DELINQUENCY AND ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 191 (1982); see also G.
MANASTER, supra, at 5 (adolescents can plan realistically for the future while becoming accountable to society).
95. Age, as an aspect of defendant's character, must be considered as a mitigating factor. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). Compare Penry v. Lynaugh,
109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955-58 (1989) (allowing execution of mentally retarded capital murderer, since age was not sufficient basis for categorical eighth amendment rule) with
Thompson, 109 S. Ct. at 2700 (eighth amendment prohibits execution of individual
under 16 at time of offense).
96. V. STREIB, supra note 6, at 7. Age is the only factor tipping the scales in
favor of the minor, but can be overcome by aggravating circumstances. See Comment,
Youth on Death Row, supra note 71, at 516.
97. Cf. Juveniles, supra note 2, at 396 (documenting that young offenders committing 9.2% of the murders, but receiving only 2.6% of death sentences, although
his statistics include assumptions). Hugo Adam Bedau, an expert on capital punishment, noted the difficulty in statistical reliance by stating: "it is impossible with the
present sort of criminal statistics to specify the exact amount of capital crimes for
even one jurisdiction in even one year for even one crime." BEDAU, supra note 4, at
312.
98. See Juveniles, supra note 2, at 387. A study on the transfer of young offenders to adult court found that few minors are referred to these criminal courts.
Between Two Worlds, supra note 81, at 212.
99. See Comment, Elastic, supra note 71, at 663. Statistics are subject to manipulation and thus "sometimes generate misleading results that are mistakenly accepted as accurate." Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1048, 1050 (1985); see also Note, Juvenile Offenders, supra note 89, at 769 (numbers
can be used to support or oppose a specific position).
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but were reluctant. 00 In the absence of such data, sentencing and
execution statistics alone are analogous to two hydrogen atoms attempting fruitlessly to create water without oxygen. An inference
that juries are unwilling to impose the death penalty on a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old murderer, must be developed from appropriate
statistics to ensure such punishment is categorically unacceptable.'
An additional flaw in the Court's reasoning involved its failure
to conduct eighth amendment proportionality analysis, acknowledged for almost a century. 102 The Supreme Court has previously
recognized that the standards of decency analysis, incorporating
public attitudes toward a given sanction, is not conclusive.103 A thorough analysis warrants a more individualized approach, since a penalty must agree with the dignity of man by not being excessive.'
The main thrust behind the eighth amendment is the prohibition against excessiveness, because the "cruel and unusual" language
immediately follows words proscribing excessive bail and fines.' A
criminal sanction is excessive and unconstitutional when a disproportion exists between the punishment imposed and the defendant's
100. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2708 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). A statistical analysis developing a ratio between the number of young
offenders sentenced to death and the number of juries refusing to impose the death
penalty is needed. See Comment, Elastic, supra note 71, at 663 n.69; cf. Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 819 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing similar statistical problem with accomplice felony murder).
101. See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2708 (O'Connor J., concurring) (number of
cases in which prosecutors did not seek death sentence also needed for statistical
analysis).
102. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2987 (1989) (Brennan J., dissenting); e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
103. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (legislation is important
indicator of current standards but not end of inquiry because eighth amendment is
safeguard against legislative abuse); e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(illustrating penal law as violative of eighth amendment).
104. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. An individualized consideration will ensure
sentencing practices which distinguish immature, irresponsible adolescents from
young, calculating murderers. See Comment, Elastic, supra note 71, at 672. The
Stanford Court incorrectly assumed that juvenile transfer statutes ensure individualized consideration because transfer and sentencing are quite different.
Just as individualized consideration is a constitutional requirement, a challenged
punishment must comport with basic humanity underlying the eighth amendment.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). However, death is not cruel within the
amendment's meaning, but rather implies more than mere extinguishment of life.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 178.
105. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972). But see R. BERGER, DEATH
PENALTIES 30 (1982) (rejecting entire eighth amendment against excessiveness, because "cruel and unusual" set off from excessive bail and fines); see supra note 4. The
Weems Court concluded that excessiveness may be unconstitutionally cruel. See
Note, Solem v. Helm: The Courts' Continued Struggle to Define Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 590, 595 (1985); see also Comment, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1471, 1487-88 (discussing excessiveness strand of eighth amendment).
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blameworthiness.' 08 Consequently, the Court must not only address
whether legislative or jury rejection of a penalty prevails, but also
whether punishment is disproportionate to the blameworthiness of
the offender.1"7
In other words, the Court should compare the harshness of the
penalty to the gravity of the offense. 108 Weighing both elements, the
Supreme Court must consider injury to person and public, and offender's moral depravity and culpability.' To ensure accuracy in
determining culpability, the Court should factor in components from
the transfer statutes including maturity, seriousness of the offense,
and response to prior juvenile treatment.11 °
The Stanford decision truly reflects the evolving standards of
decency, as no national consensus against executing a sixteen or seventeen-year-old murderer exists. However, the Court relied on faulty
statistics and failed to search further by not conducting a proportionality analysis, which is mandated by eighth amendment jurisprudence. The decision will undoubtedly impact the prosecutorial
judgments of the numerous states with no minimum age for infliction of the death penalty. In light of the Court's active involvement
106. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Two views of the
proportionality analysis exist: (1) the traditional view weighs the severity of the punishment in relation to the severity of the offense, and (2) the Enmund view examines
the severity of the punishment in relation to the defendant's blameworthiness. See
Elastic, supra note 71, at 665-67. See also Radin, Proportionality,Subjectivity, and
Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1165 (1985) (proportionality is subcategory of desert).
To clarify, the Supreme Court in the past focused on the harm caused (the offense).
More recently, however, the Court considers the defendant's responsibility for the
harm. This casenote predominately examines the latter.
The Court applied the traditional proportionality analysis in Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 597-600 (1977), where it compared the consequences of the punishment
and the consequences of the crime on the victim. The death penalty for rape was
disproportionate because the victim is still alive. Id. In contrast, the Enmund Court
concluded that the death penalty for a felony murderer was disproportionate to his
culpability, and thus unconstitutional. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
If the Court would have focused on the harm done, Enmund's culpability would not
be distinguishable and therefore the death penalty would have been constitutional.
107. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To view the evolution of the traditional proportionality analysis see Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-77; Trop,
356 U.S. at 101; Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-73, 279-80; and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173-74.
See also Bradely, Proportionality in Capital and Non-Capital Sentencing: An
Eighth Amendment Enigma, 23 IDAHo L. REV. 196 (1986-87).
108. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2988 (Brennan, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2987-88. For a discussion of the importance of culpability, see Booth
v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) and California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987).
110. Cf. Brief for Petitioner at 39, Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1988)
(No. 87-5765) (discussing due process safeguards of transfer process applying to penalty phase of trial).

1990]

Minimum Age for Death

in death penalty cases year after year,"' its vain attempt to go beyond the laws and applications of laws could be quite deadly.
Alison R. Faltersack

111. Reidinger, The Death Row Kids, 75 A.B.A. J. 78, 82 (Apr. 1989). While the
Justices issued ten full opinions on the death penalty in 1987, they had at least ten
capital cases on the docket this year. Id.

